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Note 
 
Inequitable-Conduct Doctrine Reform: Is the 
Death Penalty for Patents Still Appropriate? 
Nicole M. Murphy∗ 
The Federal Circuit’s use of the inequitable-conduct doc-
trine enables defendants to avoid all liability for infringing oth-
erwise valid patents.1 Recent application of the doctrine has 
been likened to “imposing the death penalty for relatively mi-
nor acts of misconduct.”2 When patent holders bring infringe-
ment suits, they often fear their conduct will be subject to hind-
sight bias, rendering their patents unenforceable.3 To prevail 
on an inequitable-conduct defense, an alleged infringer must 
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fessor Thomas F. Cotter for his invaluable advice and feedback. She would al-
so like to thank the editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review, notably 
Elizabeth Borer, Michael Schoepf, and Tim Sullivan for their helpful sugges-
tions and thoughtful edits. Finally, the author would like to express her grati-
tude to her husband, Brian Murphy, for his endless support and encourage-
ment, and to her family for their love and patience. Copyright © 2009 Nicole 
M. Murphy. 
 1. See S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 62 (2008) (“The defense has proven to be 
irresistible for litigants—if proven, it allows an infringer to escape any liabili-
ty for infringing a valid patent.”). 
 2. Robert Pear, Candor at Heart of Debate over Patents in Congress: 
Should Firms Lose Rights Won by Misrepresentation?, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
Apr. 30, 2008, at 11 (quoting Robert Armitage, Senior Vice President and Gen-
eral Counsel of Eli Lilly); see also Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is also inequitable to strike 
down an entire patent where the patentee only committed minor missteps or 
acted with minimal culpability or in good faith.”). 
 3. See Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation: Hearing Be-
fore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 131 (2007) (statement of Jon 
W. Dudas, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Direc-
tor, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) (noting that uncertainty surrounding 
the inequitable-conduct doctrine creates the potential for “draconian penalties” 
for innocent omissions); see also Paul M. Janicke, Inequitable Conduct: Out of 
the Frying Pan?, PATENTLY-O, Aug. 7, 2008, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2008/08/inequitable-con.html (explaining that “credible-sounding explana-
tions” for innocent omissions by applicants years after a patent filing and ap-
plication “are not that easy to come by”). 
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present clear and convincing evidence that the patent holder 
misrepresented or omitted material information during the ap-
plication process with the intent to deceive the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO).4 Recent, inconsistent application of 
the doctrine, combined with severe penalties when inequitable 
conduct is found, has heightened uncertainty around patent 
rights. 
Due to the potential windfall and lack of disincentives for 
raising the defense, alleged patent infringers now raise the doc-
trine in nearly every case.5 Even the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals—the court entrusted with hearing all patent appeals—
noted that “the habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost 
every major patent case has become an absolute plague.”6 In 
the last four years, concerns about the strength of patent rights 
have sparked repeated attempts for congressional reform of the 
patent system.7 Nevertheless, proponents of the doctrine argue 
that the draconian remedy of holding the entire patent unen-
forceable is necessary to discourage some patent applicants 
from engaging in inequitable conduct with the PTO.8  
 
 4. See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559–60 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984). 
 5. See S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 60; Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequit-
able Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 155–56 (2006) (noting that the inequitable-conduct 
defense is adjudicated in sixteen to thirty-five percent of all infringement cas-
es and inferring that, because many cases are dismissed before trial, “the per-
cent of patent cases in which a litigant plead [sic] inequitable conduct is sub-
stantially higher than these figures”). A 1998 AIPLA study found that over 
eighty percent of cases involved an allegation of inequitable conduct. Sailesh 
K. Patel & D. Christopher Ohly, Inequitable Conduct and the Patent Reform 
Act of 2009?, NASABA IP NEWSL. (N. Am. S. Asian Bar Ass’n), July 2008, at 6, 
available at http://www.nasaba.com/_uploads/_news128698009037495952_IP 
%20Section%20Newsletter%20July%202008.pdf. 
 6. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). More recently, in McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medi-
cal, Inc., Judge Newman dissented, stating that “[t]his court returns to the 
‘plague’ of encouraging unwarranted charges of inequitable conduct, spawning 
the opportunistic litigation that here succeeded despite consistently contrary 
precedent.” 487 F.3d 897, 926–27 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 7. See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006); Patent 
Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005); Patent Reform Act of 
2007: Hearing on H.R. 1908 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and 
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 43–44 
(2007) (statement of Kevin Sharer, CEO and Chairman of the Board of Amgen, 
Inc.) (“When a patent is litigated, the most innocent statements, or failures to 
disclose the smallest thing, can become the bases for charges of inequitable 
conduct.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Patent Office Prof ’l Ass’n, The Patent Reform Act Will Hurt, 
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This Note reexamines the intended and unintended conse-
quences of the inequitable-conduct doctrine and argues that 
judicial discretion is needed to create less severe outcomes. Ra-
ther than holding an entire patent unenforceable, this Note 
proposes variable minimum penalty guidelines—analogous to 
sentencing guidelines in criminal law—that react to levels of 
materiality and misconduct found by the court. The implemen-
tation of minimum guidelines by the Federal Circuit, or 
through congressional reform, will establish greater certainty 
for future patent holders and incentivize continued investment 
in innovation. 
Part I of this Note describes the development and applica-
tion of the inequitable-conduct doctrine that has led to the cur-
rent uncertainty surrounding patent enforceability. Part II 
highlights policy considerations and perspectives implicated by 
the doctrine, as well as recently suggested legislative reforms. 
Finally, Part III proposes a system of variable minimum penal-
ties based on the level of materiality and intent that would en-
sure more appropriate outcomes. 
I.  DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
INEQUITABLE-CONDUCT DOCTRINE   
The Supreme Court established the inequitable-conduct 
doctrine more than sixty years ago to prevent a patent holder 
that engaged in misconduct during its application from enforc-
ing its rights against an alleged infringer.9 But in the decades 
since its adoption, a series of court decisions has turned a mod-
est device meant to encourage candor on patent applications in-
to a trap that can extinguish the enforcement rights of honest 
applicants who make good faith mistakes or omissions.  
A. INEQUITABLE-CONDUCT DOCTRINE AND DETERRING 
MISCONDUCT ON THE PTO 
Each year, hundreds of thousands of patent applicants try 
to convince PTO examiners that their applications meet the cri-
 
Not Help, the U.S. Patent System, PROF’L INVENTORS ALLIANCE, Aug. 2007, 
http://www.piausa.org/patent_reform/articles/the_patent_reform_act_ 
will_hurt_not_help_the_u_s_patent_system (“[M]aking inequitable conduct 
less of a threat removes the very enforcement mechanism the [PTO] would use 
to insure the quality of [patent applications].”). 
 9. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 819 (1944). 
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teria for patentability.10 Applicants have a natural incentive to 
withhold information that they believe might jeopardize their 
chances of obtaining a patent, hoping a patent examiner will 
not uncover any compromising information themselves.11 To 
combat this natural tendency, the PTO established a duty to 
disclose information material to patentability.12 This duty of 
“candor and good faith” is imposed on all persons dealing with 
the PTO during the application process—called prosecution.13 If 
the PTO examiner determines the invention is patentable, a 
patent is issued.14 This gives the applicant—now a patentee—
the right to exclude all others from practicing its invention.15 
Patentees can enforce this right by alleging infringement in lit-
igation to gain relief through damages16 or an injunction17 
against the infringer’s actions.18 Conversely, alleged infringers 
can use the doctrine of inequitable conduct as a defense.19 If 
proven, the doctrine renders the entire patent unenforceable.20  
1. Development of Equity-Based Doctrine  
Before 1945, courts refused to apply an equitable defense 
to hold a patent unenforceable for failure of the patentee to dis-
close information to a PTO examiner.21 However, in Precision 
Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Ma-
chinery Co.,22 the Supreme Court broke from precedent when it 
established the inequitable-conduct doctrine in the field of pa-
tent law.23 Based on Precision’s awareness and lack of disclo-
 
 10. The number of patent applications has grown substantially from 
90,000 in 1963 to over 480,000 in 2007. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OF-
FICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR YEARS 1963–2007 (2008), 
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/us_stat.pdf. 
 11. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT 
LAW AND POLICY 1103 (4th ed. 2007).  
 12. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2008); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 11, at 49.  
 13. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a). Congress originally established the PTO in 1836 to 
examine patent applications. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117. 
 14. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 11, at 49. 
 15. Id. 
 16. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).  
 17. Id. § 283. 
 18. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 11, at 933. 
 19. Id. at 1104–05. 
 20. Id.  
 21. See Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense 
in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 39 (1993).  
 22. 324 U.S. 806, 819 (1944). 
 23. Id.; see also Goldman, supra note 21, at 37. Others have described 
Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933), as the first 
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sure of the original patentee’s fraudulent behavior, including 
the submission of false affidavits while securing its patent, the 
Court denied relief.24 The Court stated that “[t]hose who have 
applications pending with the Patent Office or who are parties 
to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromising duty to 
report to it all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitable-
ness underlying the applications at issue.”25 However, the Pre-
cision Court failed to establish a specific standard for the doc-
trine.26 Instead, after the Precision decision and until the 
establishment of the Federal Circuit in 1982, many courts 
simply created their own versions of the doctrine.27  
B. A UNIFORM TEST FOR INEQUITABLE CONDUCT HAS FAILED 
TO EMERGE 
The Federal Circuit’s test for inequitable conduct has de-
veloped into a two-step inquiry that requires clear and convinc-
ing evidence of 1) a threshold level of materiality of omitted or 
false information, and 2) a threshold level of intent to deceive 
the PTO.28 After thresholds of intent and materiality are met, 
the court “balance[s] them and determine[s] as a matter of law 
whether the scales tilt to a conclusion that inequitable conduct 
occurred.”29 Consequently, a finding of inequitable conduct in-
fects the entire patent, not only the claims affected by the ine-
quitable conduct.30 In some instances, repercussions have ex-
tended to include related patents rendered unenforceable, 
 
Supreme Court case dealing with inequitable conduct. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 
110-259, at 59 (2008); Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Note, Inequitable Conduct 
Claims in the 21st Century: Combating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
147, 149 (2005). 
 24. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 819. 
 25. Id. at 818. The inequitable-conduct doctrine was based on the judicial 
notion of preventing a party with “unclean hands” from appealing to a court 
for affirmative relief. Id. at 819. 
 26. See Goldman, supra note 21, at 52. 
 27. Cf. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2, 5–6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15–16 (citing the need to reduce forum shopping and provide 
greater consistency in the patent field as the reasons for creating the Federal 
Circuit); H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–23 (1981); Goldman, supra note 21, at 68 
(“[I]t is only a slight exaggeration to say that one could find pre-1982 decisions 
going both ways (i.e., finding or not finding inequitable conduct) on almost any 
set of facts.”). 
 28. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559–60 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
 29. Id. at 1560 (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 
F.2d 1350, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 30. See id. at 1561.  
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awards of attorney’s fees, royalty recoveries, PTO-imposed 
sanctions, and state law tort claims based on unfair competi-
tion.31  
1. Materiality Standards 
Since its establishment in 1981, the Federal Circuit has 
embraced several materiality standards—the first element of 
the inequitable-conduct doctrine.32 Compared to the court’s ap-
plication of the materiality standard used when the doctrine 
was originally adopted, courts now consider less significant in-
formation to be material.33 Initially, the three materiality stan-
dards were the objective but-for standard, the subjective but-for 
standard, and the but-it-may-have standard.34 The objective 
but-for standard places no emphasis on what the actual patent 
examiner should have done if the information had been 
known.35 Rather, it assumes the patent examiner should not 
have issued the patent but for the material information having 
been unknown.36 The subjective but-for standard takes into ac-
count that the patent examiner would not have issued the pa-
tent if the material information had been known.37 The third 
but-it-may-have standard considers information to be material 
if it may have influenced the patent examiner had it been 
known at the time of application.38 
In 1984, the Federal Circuit added to the number of stan-
dards by adopting the reasonable-examiner standard based on 
 
 31. See Kevin R. Casey, “Infectious Unenforceability”: The Extent or Reach 
of Inequitable Conduct on Associated Patents, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 338, 342–54 
(1989) (describing how courts have held patents-in-suit and parent applica-
tions related to the unenforceable patent also unenforceable through the con-
cept of infectious unenforceability); see also Elizabeth Peters, Are We Living in 
a Material World?: An Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Materiality Standard 
Under the Patent Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1519, 1527 
(2008); James Cronin, Comment, Inequitable Conduct and the Standard of 
Materiality: Why the Federal Circuit Should Use the Reasonable Patent Ex-
aminer Standard, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1327, 1337 (2006). 
 32. See J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559–60. 
 33. See Goldman, supra note 21, 55–62 (describing how the amount of in-
formation required by the duty of disclosure expanded from “prior art that 
would completely anticipate the claimed invention” to include any information 
that a reasonable examiner would consider important).  
 34. See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick, 725 F.2d at 1367.  
 35. See Plastic Container Corp. v. Cont’l Plastics of Okla., Inc., 607 F.2d 
885, 899 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. 
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PTO’s Rule 56 standard of materiality.39 This standard consid-
ers information material if there was “substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in de-
ciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.”40 
The adoption of the reasonable-examiner standard “made the 
[inequitable-conduct] defense appear substantially easier to es-
tablish,” thereby making it an easy defense for alleged infring-
ers to exploit.41 Additionally, the Federal Circuit adopted a slid-
ing-scale approach which allows inequitable conduct to be 
found for high levels of materiality with low levels of intent, 
and vice versa.42 Finally in 1992, the PTO endorsed yet another 
test that considers information that presents a prima facie case 
of unpatentability to be material.43 
At the time, some practitioners and judges believed mate-
riality for patents issued before 1992 relied on the reasonable-
examiner standard, while patents issued after 1992 relied on 
the newer prima facie standard.44 However, in Digital Control 
Inc. v. Charles Machine Works, the Federal Circuit declared 
that the standard for materiality includes all prior standards, 
but gave no direction on when each standard applies.45 Conse-
 
 39. Am. Hoist & Derrick, 725 F.2d at 1363 (stating that the PTO’s Rule 
1.56(a), reasonable-examiner standard, is the starting point for determining 
materiality).  
 40. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1988). 
 41. Goldman, supra note 21, at 70. 
 42. Am. Hoist & Derrick, 725 F.2d at 1363 (“Questions of ‘materiality’ and 
‘culpability’ are often interrelated and intertwined, so that a lesser showing of 
the materiality of the withheld information may suffice when an intentional 
scheme to defraud is established, whereas a greater showing of the materiality 
of withheld information would necessarily create an inference that its nondis-
closure was ‘wrongful.’” (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Diamond, 653 F.2d 
701, 716 (1st Cir. 1981))); see also Abbot Labs. v. Torpham, Inc., 300 F.3d 
1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he intent necessary to establish inequitable 
conduct is based on a sliding scale related to the materiality of omission.” (cit-
ing Critikon v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997))); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 11, at 1129 (describing the sliding 
scale of intent in the Federal Circuit).  
 43. Peters, supra note 31, at 1532; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(1)–(2) 
(2004). 
 44. Peters, supra note 31, at 1534–35 (describing the combination of two 
cases by the Federal Circuit to establish that the materiality standard used 
would be determined by what the PTO standard was when the patent was is-
sued); see, e.g., Tom Brody, Duty to Disclose: Dayco Products v. Total Contain-
ment, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 692, 693 (2008) (describing the 
Federal Circuit’s occasional deference to the current PTO materiality stan-
dard). 
 45. 437 F.3d 1309, 1314–16 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (describing the evolution of 
the material standard and stating that even though the previous PTO Rule 
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quently, courts are not consistently applying the multimaterial 
standard approach46 and instead, generally rely on the reason-
able-examiner standard.47 Recently, the Federal Circuit noted 
the doctrine has broadened “to encompass misconduct less 
egregious than fraud,”48 such as improper claiming of small 
entity status,49 incorrect payment of maintenance fees,50 and 
false statements about searches performed.51  
2. Inconsistent Application of Intent-to-Deceive Standard 
In Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 
the Federal Circuit raised the level of scienter for intent to 
deceive—the second element of inequitable conduct.52 The court 
held that intent to deceive could not be shown by grossly negli-
gent behavior alone.53 The Kingsdown decision initially reduced 
the number of allegations of inequitable conduct until the 
courts turned to the sliding scale as an alternative to the stric-
ter intent standard. 
Since Kingsdown, Federal Circuit panels have inconsis-
tently applied the intent standard. For instance, the Ferring 
 
1.56(a) was the dominant standard applied from 1984 until 1992, it did not 
eliminate the prior materiality tests, and concluding that the new PTO Rule 
56 was not meant to override existing case law and therefore is an additional 
test for materiality). 
 46. One implied benefit of the multiple-material standard was the possi-
bility of using it in conjunction with the sliding-scale test, but this has not 
been seen. Peters, supra note 31, at 1537–39. 
 47. See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1187 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (stating that the Federal Circuit continues to use the pre-1992 PTO lan-
guage for the reasonable-examiner standard of materiality even though all 
materiality standards are available for use (citing Digital Control, Inc. v. 
Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313–17 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 48. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 49. Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 
see also David K.S. Cornwell & Mark W. Rygiel, How to Identify the Single 
Tiles of the Inequitable Conduct Mosaic, AIPLA, Fall 2007, at 2–14, available 
at http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Speaker_Papers/Annual_ 
Meeting_Speaker_Papers/200717/Cornwell-paper.pdf (describing their “best 
practices” in uncovering inequitable conduct and stringing together “benign” 
mistakes to create a “mosaic” to help prove the defense claims). 
 50. Ulead Sys., Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351 F.3d 1139, 1146 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 51. Gen. Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 1411 
(Fed. Cir. 1994).  
 52. 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“We adopt the view that 
a finding that particular conduct amounts to ‘gross negligence’ does not itself 
justify an inference of intent to deceive . . . .”). 
 53. Id. 
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B.V. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. panel upheld the application of a 
negligence standard of “knew or should have known” due to the 
“high materiality” of the information omitted from the patent 
application.54 The same panel reiterated that summary judg-
ment is allowed for “highly material” information if the record 
shows the applicant knew of the information withheld, the ap-
plicant “knew or should have known” the information was ma-
terial, and the applicant lacked a credible explanation for with-
holding the information.55 In sum, whether explicitly using the 
sliding scale or not, Ferring suggests that the negligence stan-
dard is applicable whenever omitted or false information is 
considered “highly material.”56 This approach deviates from the 
higher scienter level demanded in Kingsdown.57 Another Fed-
eral Circuit panel has since disagreed with the Ferring stan-
dard for inferring intent.  
In Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Corp., the 
Federal Circuit refused to infer intent to deceive from the omit-
ted information, and instead required additional evidence.58 
The court articulated that, while intent can be inferred from 
indirect and circumstantial evidence, it must be to a clear and 
convincing standard.59 To infer intent from indirect or circums-
tantial evidence, the court asserted that the inference must “be 
the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the 
evidence.”60 The court stated that only after an adequate dem-
onstration of both materiality and intent should the district 
 
 54. 437 F.3d 1181, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The district court found that 
submission of affidavits by affiliates of the applicant without disclosing their 
relationship constituted clear and convincing evidence that the applicant in-
tended to deceive the PTO examiner and that the information was highly ma-
terial. Id. at 1190, 1193–94. 
 55. Id. at 1191. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Compare MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 11, at 1129 (describing the low 
level of intent necessary under the sliding-scale approach when there is high 
materiality), with Hollister, 863 F.2d at 876 (holding that gross negligence 
does not on its own justify an inference of intent). 
 58. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 
1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Lisa A. Dolak, Inequitable Conduct: A Flawed Doc-
trine Worth Saving (2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1276414# (discussing Star Scientific).  
 59. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366. 
 60. Id. If more than one plausible inference may be drawn from the evi-
dence proffered by the alleged infringer, then it is insufficient for inferring an 
intent to deceive and a finding otherwise would be clearly erroneous. Id. at 
1366–67 (quoting Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys., 528 F.3d 1365, 
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
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court consider the equities by weighing the factors or looking to 
the sliding scale.61  
After Star Scientific, some practitioners believed the doc-
trine’s intent prong had been raised back to a higher-level re-
quirement.62 However, this belief was short lived.63 In Praxair, 
Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., the Federal Circuit upheld an inequitable-
conduct defense after noting that the omitted prior art64 be-
came “highly material” from statements made to the PTO dur-
ing prosecution.65 One dissenting justice stated that he believed 
“the district court incorrectly conflated intent with materiali-
ty.”66 The judge was upset that intent was not considered inde-
pendently from the materiality of the omitted prior art,67 in 
conflict with the standard articulated in Star Scientific68 and 
Kingsdown.69 The current intent standard is inconsistently ap-
plied, allowing highly material omissions to permit inferences 
of intent to deceive.70  
 
 61. Id. at 1367–68 (reversing the district court’s finding of intent to dece-
ive because the defendant had not carried its burden of establishing a thre-
shold level of intent to deceive (citing Critikon v. Becton Dickinson Vascular 
Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997))). 
 62. Jeremy C. Lowe, Raising Questions About Patent Deception; Critics 
Call for Reform of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, CONN. L. TRIB., Oct. 13, 
2008, at 16.  
 63. A month after Star Scientific was decided, another Federal Circuit 
panel appeared to reverse course in Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306 
(Fed. Cir. 2008), stirring up more criticism and uncertainty in the application 
of the doctrine. Lowe, supra note 62. 
 64. Generally, prior art includes information publicly known before the 
filing of the patent application. See generally Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. 
Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 989, 1017 n.147 (2008) (noting that there is no statutory defini-
tion of “prior art” and explaining that it generally includes information con-
tained in 35 U.S.C. § 102 such as prior patents and known inventions). 
 65. Praxair, 543 F.3d 1306, 1313–16 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reiterating that 
“highly material” information is subject to an inference of intent if the Ferring 
standard is met finding omitted prior art highly material in the context of four 
statements made to the PTO during prosecution that there was no prior art 
similar to that which was omitted). The Federal Circuit did not allow an infe-
rence of intent arising from the same omitted prior art of another patent be-
cause it did not share the prosecution statements. Id. at 1318. 
 66. Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., dissenting).  
 67. Id.  
 68. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 69. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc). 
 70. Compare id. (citing M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling 
Co., 439 F.3d 1335, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (noting that the court in M. 
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3. Consequences of the Federal Circuit’s Recent Inconsistent 
Application of the Doctrine  
The Federal Circuit’s application of the inequitable-conduct 
doctrine since 2006 has raised the level of uncertainty for pa-
tent holders in the United States in several ways.71 First, the 
Federal Circuit broadened materiality to include all previous 
standards and information unrelated to patentability.72 Second, 
Federal Circuit panels are using inconsistent standards for in-
ferring intent to deceive.73 Even the courts are cautioning 
against applying the defense too lightly because the penalty 
remains severe.74 Third, alleged infringers are often enticed to 
raise the defense given the low likelihood of having to pay 
damages for meritless defenses75 and the high reward potential 
of having an entire patent held unenforceable.  
II.  IMPORTANT PATENT POLICY AND FAILED 
LEGISLATIVE REFORM   
Due to the recent, inconsistent use of the inequitable-
conduct doctrine by the Federal Circuit, there is a strong push 
for swift change. However, it is important to understand the 
policy rationales and parties involved before undertaking to 
“fix” the doctrine. The following sections highlight the policy ra-
 
Eagles found “a lack of good faith explanation of nondisclosure insufficient to 
infer intent to deceive the PTO”), and Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 
543 F.3d 1351, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (upholding a district court’s decision that, 
based on a lack of “independent” evidence for the omitted information, there 
was no intent to deceive), with Praxair, 543 F.3d at 1313–16 (allowing the 
“high materiality” of the misconduct to satisfy an inference of intent without 
additional evidence of intent to deceive).  
 71. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2–3, Ferring B.V. v. Barr 
Labs., Inc., 549 U.S. 1015 (2006) (No. 06-372) (describing the negative impact 
of an inconsistent doctrine). 
 72. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1314–16 
(Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 73. See supra note 70.  
 74. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 75. In Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit scolded Mylan for bringing numerous meritless inequitable-
conduct claims and awarded exceptional damages to Takeda. 549 F.3d 1381, 
1385, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court and agreeing the “ine-
quitable conduct claim was ‘always frivolous’ and unsupported, as Mylan did 
not present any evidence that Takeda hid or misrepresented any information 
to the PTO” (quoting Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 459 F. 
Supp. 2d 227, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))).  
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tionales for maintaining the doctrine and also identify some of 
the perspectives of those involved in the patent system.  
A. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS INHERENT IN THE DOCTRINE OF 
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT  
Granting patents is intended “to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.”76 One notable social benefit of the pa-
tent system is the publication of the invention.77 The public 
gains access to the invention in exchange for allowing the pa-
tent holder to have a monopoly and right to exclude others for 
the duration of the patent term.78 The inefficiency of granting a 
monopoly is one of the social costs of granting patents.79 The 
“far-reaching social and economic consequences of a patent” 
give the public a strong incentive to ensure that patents come 
from “backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable con-
duct.”80 Encouragement of financial investment into the re-
search and development of patentable innovations is another 
 
 76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 77. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 11, at 63–64 (noting that beginning 
in 1999 most patent applications are published after eighteen months, allow-
ing researchers to know what problems are already solved and to begin to im-
prove new breakthroughs). Inherent in the idea of adding to public knowledge 
is that patents should not be granted for ideas or knowledge already known to 
the public. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“A person shall be entitled to a pa-
tent unless—(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country . . . 
.”). Additionally, certain subject matters are seen as unfit for patentability be-
cause they are considered within the storehouse of public knowledge. Exam-
ples include naturally occurring “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and ab-
stract ideas.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); see also § 101 
(allowing patents for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter”). 
 78. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (providing that patent terms generally last twenty 
years after the filing date which allows patent holders to exclude others from 
copying their invention).  
 79. Some economists argue that patent monopolies are socially inefficient, 
while others have recently argued that patents are not necessarily synonym-
ous with monopoly because many patents have imperfect substitutes availa-
ble. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 372–402 (2003) (arguing that patents 
are not monopolies in the traditional sense and noting several counterargu-
ments). 
 80. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 816 (1945); see also Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 
488 F.3d 982, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Applicants for patents have a duty to 
prosecute patent applications in the Patent Office with candor, good faith, and 
honesty.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2008) (describing the duty to disclose informa-
tion material to patentability). 
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chief aim of the patent system.81 The current discrepant appli-
cation of the inequitable-conduct doctrine by the Federal Cir-
cuit, combined with the doctrine’s severe consequences, may 
stunt the strong incentives created by the ability to patent.82 
1. Maintaining the Inequitable-Conduct Doctrine—Lack of 
Adequate Alternatives 
Inequitable conduct remains a problem in patent prosecu-
tion.83 If the doctrine is eliminated, patents obtained through 
fraud or otherwise deceitful means will likely be enforceable.84 
Further, there is no ready substitute.85 The doctrine of unclean 
hands fails because it generally cannot be raised by a party 
who is foreign to the alleged misconduct when it occurs.86  
Other alternatives for preventing misconduct during prose-
cution are also susceptible to criticism and are inadequate re-
placements for the doctrine.87 One possibility is making the 
 
 81. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (“Another policy of the system is to stimulate the investment of risk cap-
ital in the commercialization of useful patentable inventions so that the public 
gets some benefit from them, which may not occur in the absence of some pa-
tent protection.”). 
 82. There was hope after Star Scientific that the Federal Circuit was rein-
ing in the broadened intent prong but that hope was shattered by the later 
Praxair opinion by a different Federal Circuit panel. Lowe, supra note 62. 
 83. See, e.g., Applied Materials, Inc. v. Multimetrixs, LLC, No. C06-07372, 
2008 WL 2892453, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2008) (holding a patent to be un-
enforceable for inequitable conduct based on the submission of a signature 
forged after the inventor’s death). 
 84. Dolak, supra note 58, at 6.  
 85. See id. (describing the possible alternatives and their respective short-
comings). 
 86. Casey, supra note 31, at 347–52 (stating that the doctrine of unclean 
hands includes conduct that is “unconscionable and willful,” is not an affirma-
tive defense that can be raised by another party, but must be raised by courts 
in order to “protect their own integrity”); see also, Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. 
Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244–46 (1933) (describing the limitation of the 
unclean hands doctrine); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 32 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004) (stating that the doc-
trine of unclean hands “is a rule of equitable disqualification or forfeiture that 
is frequently asserted as a defense to liability for benefits received pursuant to 
illegal contracts” where “a party guilty of inequitable conduct in the underly-
ing transaction may on that account be denied a claim based on unjust 
enrichment”). 
 87. Dolak, supra note 58, at 6–7. Limitations of current proposed alterna-
tives include some conduct’s inability to cause the patent to be invalidated, the 
likely failure of PTO disciplinary actions to deter all misconduct, and the high 
burden of proof that would act as a barrier to successful antitrust, unfair com-
petition, fraud, and tortious interference claims. Id.   
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PTO responsible for implementing the doctrine.88 However, 
adding duties to the already backlogged PTO will make en-
forcement less likely and therefore less of a deterrent to mis-
conduct.89 Additionally, eliminating the doctrine and requiring 
defendants to bring antitrust or common law fraud claims 
creates too high a burden on defendants.90 Compared to PTO 
enforcement or bringing antitrust/fraud claims, the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct is useful because it addresses misconduct 
more quickly and effectively. Therefore, addressing the current 
state of uncertainty through modification of the doctrine, in-
stead of elimination, is a more reasonable solution. 
2. Parties Affected by Modifications of the Inequitable-
Conduct Doctrine 
The patent system is an interwoven network involving 
many parties, including patent examiners, patent practitioners 
(such as attorneys or patent agents who prosecute patents), in-
ventors, businesses, and industries. Some parties form groups 
and lobby Congress.91 Each party discussed below is a typical 
player in the patent system with primary motivations to reform 
the doctrine. 
Patent examiners are the PTO’s gatekeepers and have ex-
clusive authority to issue patents.92 Patent examiners93 support 
policies that discourage litigation and focus on patent quality,94 
and support standardization of the doctrine. Patent-
practitioner organizations95 support legislation that removes 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., Pear, supra note 2, at 11 (noting that the Coalition for Patent 
Fairness spent more than $2.5 million on lobbyists over a fifteen-month period 
in 2007–08 versus a competing coalition, the Coalition for 21st Century Patent 
Reform, which recently paid over $1.8 million to lobbyists). 
 92. United States Patent and Trademark Office, General Information 
Concerning Patents, Examination of Applications and Proceedings in the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/pac/doc/general/index.html#examination (last visited Apr. 27, 2009) (“If 
the examiner’s decision on patentability is favorable, a patent is granted.”) 
 93. See, e.g., Patent Office Professional  Association, About Us, 
http://www.popa.org/php/misc/about.php (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
 94. Robert B. Budens, President, Patent Office Professional Association, 
Open Letter (Dec. 2007), http://www.popa.org/pdf/misc/reform3-06feb2008.pdf 
(describing POPA’s opposition to the proposed modifications of the patent sys-
tem in the Patent Reform Act of 2007 but not stating POPA’s position on the 
proposed inequitable-conduct modifications). 
 95. See, e.g., Introduction to and History of the National Association of 
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claims from the courts and oppose changes that would make it 
easier to raise the defense.96 They are concerned that the cur-
rent implementation of the doctrine reduces patent strength 
while increasing litigation costs, all for little or no additional 
benefit.97 Patent practitioners would benefit from increased 
certainty from reform because it would encourage more use of 
the patent system. 
Conversely, small businesses and inventor-entrepreneurs98 
oppose legislation that reduces the applicability of the doctrine 
or limits it to administration by the PTO.99 Most small busi-
nesses and inventor-entrepreneurs view the doctrine as a valu-
able tool to help ensure that big businesses deal honestly with 
the PTO because other consequences, namely financial penal-
ties, may not have the same effect.100  
Industry groups also vie for legislative attention. In 2005, 
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) presented Congress 
with its list of proposed modifications to the current patent sys-
tem.101 The modifications were aimed at decreasing costs and 
reducing patent-infringement litigation by modifying or elimi-
nating subjective elements of litigation, including the doc-
 
Patent Practitioners, the NAPP, http://www.napp.org/about (last visited Apr. 
27, 2009). 
 96. Letter from Ron Reardon & Louis J. Hoffman, Nat’l Ass’n of Patent 
Practitioners, to Sens. Harry Reid and Mitch McConnell (Dec. 27, 2007), 
available at http://www.napp.org/resources/NAPP-OppTo2007SenateBill.pdf 
(describing NAPP’s opposition to the modifications of the Senate’s version of 
the Patent Reform Act of 2007). 
 97. See generally Christopher Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Ine-
quitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2009), avail-
able at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context 
=bclt (arguing that the cost and effort required when inequitable conduct is 
raised generally yields little benefit for the other areas of the litigation such as 
validity and infringement and may detract from the overall quality of the reso-
lution). 
 98. See, e.g. Professional Inventors Alliance, http://www.piausa.org (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
 99. Professional Inventors Alliance, Limitation of Inequitable Conduct: 
The PIA Viewpoint, http://www.piausa.org/patent_reform_issues/limitation_ 
of_inequitable_conduct (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
 100. Cf. Stephen Castle & David Jolly, Europe Fines Microsoft $1.3 Billion, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/28/business/ 
worldbusiness/28msoft.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=microsoft%20european%20fine 
&st=cse (describing the effects of heavy fines in antitrust law). 
 101. Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 133–36 (2005) [hereinafter Patent Quality Improvements] (statement of 
Richard C. Levin, President, Yale University).  
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trine.102 The NAS committee believed its proposals would not 
“substantially affect[] the principles that these aspects of the 
enforcement system were meant to promote,” but would instead 
reduce litigation by increasing the predictability of litigation 
outcomes.103 Similar to the NAS, certain business industries 
banded together to voice their support for elimination of the 
doctrine. 
Members of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical indus-
tries recognize the importance of patents and advocate the need 
for strong patent rights.104 It is common for a handful of pa-
tents to represent the value of their business and only oppor-
tunities for capital financing.105 Similarly, other groups in the 
biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and technology industries106 ar-
gue that the doctrine should be reserved for the PTO because of 
its expertise in patent prosecution.107 These groups further ar-
gue that the doctrine should ultimately be eliminated as a liti-
gation defense because it creates too much uncertainty and de-
creases voluntary communications between patent 
practitioners and patent examiners.108 Nonetheless, some ge-
neric drug manufacturers argue that the elimination of the doc-
trine would make it easier for brand-name manufacturers “to 
cheat and get away with it, easier for them to defend their pa-
tents and more difficult for us to get generic products onto the 
market in a timely way.”109  
 
 102. Id. at 132. 
 103. Id. at 136. 
 104. See, e.g., Biotechnology Industry Organization, About BIO, http://bio 
.org/aboutbio (last visited Apr. 27, 2009); Biotechnology Industry Organiza-
tion, Patent Reform, http://bio.org/ip/domestic (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
 105. Biotechnology Industry Organization, Patent Reform, http://bio.org/ip/ 
domestic (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
 106. See, e.g., Patents Matter, Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform, 
http://www.patentsmatter.com/about/who_we_are.php (last visited Apr. 27, 
2009). 
 107. See, e.g., BIOTECH. INDUS. ORG., THE UNENFORCEABILITY DEFENSE 
BASED ON INEQUITABLE CONDUCT SHOULD BE REPEALED 1, http://bio 
.org/ip/domestic/inequitableconduct.pdf (advancing instead the position that 
courts should not be able to hold patents unenforceable due to matters unre-
lated to “actual invalidity”); COALITION FOR 21ST CENTURY PATENT REFORM, 
POSITION ON S. 1145 (2008), http://www.patentsmatter.com/issue/pdfs/ 
OnePager_021508.pdf. 
 108. See, e.g., BIOTECH. INDUS. ORG., supra note 107; COALITION FOR 21ST 
CENTURY PATENT REFORM, supra note 107. 
 109. Pear, supra note 2 (quoting Debra Barrett, a vice president of Teva 
Pharmaceutical Industries, the world’s largest generic drug manufacturer). 
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Unlike the biotech and pharmaceutical industries, which 
may rely on a few patents for their survival, businesses in the 
high-tech industry may require hundreds of patents for a single 
product.110 Some high-tech organizations believe current patent 
rights are too strong and overreaching.111 They likely support 
leaving the doctrine in the courts and support standardization 
that would make the defense easier to prove. 
Any modification of the doctrine would affect the stake-
holders involved in the patent system. But, by not addressing 
the shortcomings of the doctrine, the Federal Circuit and Con-
gress are unintentionally destabilizing all of the parties in-
volved.  
B. MODIFICATIONS TO THE INEQUITABLE-CONDUCT DOCTRINE 
RECENTLY PROPOSED IN CONGRESS 
Due to patentees’ recent cries for alleviation from the doc-
trine’s draconian application, Congress has repeatedly tried to 
reform the patent system and continues to propose modifica-
tions of the doctrine. The Patent Reform Act of 2006112 sought 
to eliminate the defense of inequitable conduct except in cases 
where the alleged infringer also proved at least one claim 
invalid.113 Additionally, the Act barred an alleged infringer 
from raising an inequitable-conduct claim until the patent was 
found valid as a whole and infringed.114 Senator Hatch intro-
 
 110. See, e.g., Ephraim Schwartz, Patent Reform Favors High Tech Over 
Biotech, INFOWORLD, Sept. 7, 2007, http://weblog.infoworld.com/realitycheck/ 
archives/2007/09/patent_reform_f.html (discussing the attempt in the Patent 
Reform Act of 2007 to limit damages which would benefit high-tech companies 
with thousands of patents but hurt pharmaceutical companies which may rely 
on high damage awards to prevent others from infringing upon their one or 
two patents). 
 111. See, e.g., Matthew R. Osenga, John W. Thompson Is Leading Candi-
date for Commerce Secretary, INVENTIVE STEP, Jan. 28, 2009, 
http://inventivestep.net/2009/01/28/john-w-thompson-is-leading-candidate-for-
commerce-secretary (last visited Apr. 27, 2009) (quoting the Coalition for Pa-
tent Fairness as saying that “over-broad patent grants stifle future innovators, 
while unjustified lawsuits that aim to extort settlements without regard to the 
merits of underlying patents clog the courts”). Some critics of the Coalition for 
Patent Fairness criticize CPF for wanting reduced patent rights so that they 
are able to infringe other’s patents more easily. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Why Pa-
tent Reform Didn’t Happen in 2008, IPWATCHDOG, Dec. 28, 2008, http:// 
www.ipwatchdog.com/2008/12/28/coalition-for-patent-infringement/id=1160.  
 112. S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006). The Patent Reform Act of 2006 pro-
posed to modify § 282 of the current code to limit the permitted ground for un-
enforceability to only cases of invalidity. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  
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duced the bill on behalf of himself and Senator Leahy in 
2006,115 but it failed to pass in the Senate.116 After numerous 
hearings and testimony from those involved in the patent sys-
tem, Congress considered a new bill in 2007.117 
1. Patent Reform Act of 2007: The Reasonable-Examiner 
Standard and Codification of Current Case Law 
The Patent Reform Act of 2007 did not substantially reduce 
or eliminate the inequitable-conduct defense.118 Instead, the 
Act proposed adopting the “reasonable patent examiner” stan-
dard.119 However, the benefit of the increased certainty from 
adopting a single materiality standard is limited because the 
reasonable-examiner standard is the broadest standard ap-
plied.120 Therefore, the proposed change still allows much un-
certainty for patent practitioners and patentees. This is unlike 
previous legislative proposals that adopted the narrower but-
for standard of materiality.121  
The Act allows intent to be inferred when it is not based 
solely on gross negligence of the patent owner or its representa-
tive, or on the materiality of the misconduct.122 This codifies the 
intent standard articulated in Kingsdown123 and overrides any 
conflicting precedent created afterwards by Star Scientific124 
 
 115. Id. pmbl. 
 116. 153 CONG. REC. S15,898-01 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2007) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy). 
 117. Id.  
 118. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 12 (2008); Pa-
tent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12(c) (2007). The Patent 
Reform Act of 2007 is seen by many to heavily favor alleged infringers or likely 
defendants in infringement suits due to the increased methods of holding the 
patent unenforceable. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act of 2007: Pre-
liminary Notes and Comment Part I, PATENTLY-O, Apr. 22, 2007, http://www 
.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/04/patent_reform_a_2.html. 
 119. S. 1145. 
 120. See Reardon & Hoffman, supra note 96. 
 121. See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006) (adopt-
ing the requirement that a patent would have been invalid had the misconduct 
not occurred); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005) 
(adopting a limitation on the materiality standard in § 136(d) that is essential-
ly equivalent to the but-for materiality standard).  
 122.  S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006) (proposing § 298(b) intent). 
 123.  Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 
876 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (holding that intent to deceive could not be 
shown by “grossly negligent” behavior alone but that a higher level of intent 
was required). 
 124. Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (reiterating that materiality and intent are separate ele-
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and Praxair.125 Although the Act would codify Kingsdown and 
lessen some uncertainty, critics point out that it fails “to make 
broadly supported reforms to eliminate litigation abuse of the 
doctrine and gain increases in patent quality.”126 
Finally, the Act proposes alternatives for courts that find 
inequitable conduct to still hold parts of the patent enforcea-
ble.127 These options include holding one or more of the claims 
unenforceable or holding that the patentee is only eligible for 
reasonable royalties instead of equitable relief such as a tempo-
rary or permanent injunction.128 This would allow courts to im-
plement consequences more tailored to the misconduct of the 
patentee.129 Additionally, reducing the current windfall for al-
leged infringers from entire patent unenforceability to only rea-
sonable royalties or limited enforceability would likely decrease 
the incentive for bringing questionable claims.130 However, in-
creasing the number of options for the court, absent more guid-
ance, will not reduce anxiety felt by involved parties because it 
will only increase unpredictability.131 
The bill passed the House of Representatives in September 
2007, but failed to pass the Senate due to disputes regarding 
the proposed modification of damage awards.132 Senator Kyl 
proposed the Patent Reform Act of 2008133 after opposing some 
parts of the Patent Reform Act of 2007.134 
 
ments). 
 125. Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(Lourie, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority erred in inferring intent be-
cause it did not determine that the patentees had knowledge of the materiality 
of the omission and by failing to balance materiality and intent to determine if 
a finding of inequitable conduct was appropriate). 
 126. See Reardon & Hoffman, supra note 96 (noting that over 430 groups 
joined together in writing a letter of opposition to the senators that proposed 
the Patent Reform Act of 2007). 
 127. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 12 (2008). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Dolak, supra note 58, at 12. 
 130. S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 60–62 (2008) (statement of Sens. Spector and 
Hatch); Dolak, supra note 58, at 12. 
 131. S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 60–62. 
 132. See Andrew Noyes, Leahy, Berman Patent Bills Come Under Fresh 
Criticism, CONGRESSDAILY, Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.nationaljournal.com 
/congressdaily/print_friendly.php?ID=cdp_20081209_7028 (describing the life 
of the Patent Reform Act of 2007 and courts’ recent decisions addressing many 
of the proposed modifications). 
 133. 154 CONG. REC. S9982 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. 
Kyl). 
 134. S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 64–68 (providing the additional views on the 
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2. Patent Reform Act of 2008: More-Likely-Than-Not 
Standard, Reissue, and Administrative Proceedings 
Adoption of the Patent Reform Act of 2008135 would result 
in sweeping changes to the doctrine of inequitable conduct.136 
According to Senator Kyl, current practitioners either choose 
not to research any prior art to avoid providing it to the PTO or 
provide anything that could be considered relevant, without 
characterization.137 By choosing to avoid researching prior art 
during prosecution, patent practitioners cannot be accused of 
withholding, thereby eliminating the possibility of applying the 
doctrine.138 But practitioners still have a duty to provide any 
known material information.139 Senator Kyl also argues that, 
by not characterizing information that is provided, patent prac-
titioners may be flooding the PTO, but will not be found later to 
have misled the patent examiner.140 By eliminating judicial re-
view of the doctrine, proponents of the bill believe that patent 
practitioners will work with patent examiners to identify the 
most relevant prior art or material information for the patent 
at issue.141 
The Act would require any district court that faces an ine-
quitable-conduct claim to put the patent into reissue proceed-
ings, which would allow the PTO to effectively strip the patent 
of any invalid claims.142 However, the district court would still 
be responsible for determining the facts of the alleged miscon-
 
Patent Reform Act of 2007 of Sens. Specter, Kyl, Grassley, Coburn, and 
Brownback, including their opposition to the proposed language of “specific 
contribution over the prior art”). 
 135. Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 136. 154 CONG. REC. S9992 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. 
Kyl).  
 137. Id. at S9991 (quoting a patent official as saying that “the doctrine re-
sults in counterproductive behavior before the USPTO. It discourages many 
applicants from conducting a search and leads others to be indiscriminate in 
the information they submit”). 
 138. Id. 
 139. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2008) (asserting that practitioners have “a duty to 
disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to 
patentability as defined in this section”). 
 140. 154 CONG. REC. S9991 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. 
Kyl). 
 141. Id. at S9990 (discussing a future where patent practitioners are more 
candid with the PTO and provide more useful information). 
 142. Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 11 (2008) (propos-
ing § 298, which would require the district court to order “reissue proceedings” 
after misconduct is found to be “more likely than not”). 
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duct.143 The Director of the PTO would have up to one year to 
determine if the patent or claims were valid before otherwise 
terminating the reissue proceedings.144  
The proposed changes for the district court do not effective-
ly address some of the problems associated with the current 
doctrine. First, the more-likely-than-not burden for forcing pa-
tentees into reissue proceedings may be easier for defendants to 
satisfy than the clear and convincing standard that is now re-
quired when raising the defense.145 Defendants may use this as 
another tactic to increase the duration and expense of litiga-
tion. Additionally, by continuing to require the district court to 
make findings of fact for the PTO’s reissue proceedings, there 
does not appear to be savings of time and effort for discovery.146 
One potential benefit of the proposed threshold for reissue pa-
tents is the adoption of a but-for objective standard for mate-
riality, which requires that the evidence demonstrate that, 
more likely than not, the patent should not have been issued 
but for the misconduct of the patentee.147 Even so, adopting the 
objective but-for standard would not add anything to the court’s 
ability to strike claims because, under this standard, miscon-
duct is only material if it should have prevented the patent ex-
aminer from issuing the patent. During litigation, the same in-
formation would invalidate the affected claims or patent. 
Therefore, there is no advantage to using the objective but-for 
standard because information that satisfies the but-for stan-
dard requires a court, at a minimum, to hold those claims 
invalid regardless of the intent of the applicant. Once a claim is 
 
 143. Id. (requiring the court to set out “with specificity” the findings of fact 
that support its order for reissue proceedings). 
 144. Id.  
 145. Compare id. (requiring a showing of “more likely than not” that mis-
conduct occurred as to material information, such that, but for the misconduct, 
the patent would not have issued), with J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 
747 F.2d 1553, 1559–60 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (describing the standard of proof for 
inequitable conduct as “clear and convincing evidence”). Furthermore, the 
2008 act provides that if the patentee, after a motion for reissue is made, does 
not seek reissue within two months, the patent is still held unenforceable to 
the benefit of the defendant. S. 3600. 
 146. The NRC pointed out that one important reason to eliminate the doc-
trine from the purview of judicial discretion is the expensive and time-
consuming discovery involved in a nonobjective inquiry. See Patent Quality 
Improvement, supra note 101. 
 147. See S. 3600 (requiring, in § 298(b)(1)(A), that the motion for reissue 
proceedings set forth the reasons why, considering the misconduct, the patent 
or its claims are invalid). 
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invalid, there is no practical consequence to holding it unenfor-
ceable because it cannot be enforced regardless.  
The proposed requirement of reissue proceedings would re-
sult in additional expense and delay, a particularly problematic 
consequence considering the delay that already exists in the 
PTO.148 Moreover, judges are better equipped than the PTO to 
deal with issues involving the doctrine because they have more 
experience weighing equitable considerations.149  
Further, the Act proposes administrative proceedings to al-
low complaints brought by any party, against any applicant, 
patentee, or even those requesting an administrative proceed-
ing from the PTO.150 The Act outlines procedures for the PTO 
to gather evidence such as obtaining documents and deposing 
witnesses for their proceedings.151 Findings of misconduct by 
the Director carry substantial sanctions, including financial 
penalties of $150,000 for each act of misconduct, and up to 
$10,000,000 for more egregious acts, as well as the potential for 
having one or more patents held unenforceable.152 The allow-
ance of administrative proceedings that create more opportuni-
ties to hold claims unenforceable increases uncertainty for pa-
tent holders. Further, set fees do not deter misconduct 
unilaterally—they create significant burdens on smaller busi-
nesses or inventors while failing to deter financially established 
enterprises. 
The Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform has called 
for the new Congress to “stop, look and listen” before adopting 
radical new changes in the 2009 legislature.153 Even the judi-
ciary is questioning current proposals. Chief Judge Paul Michel 
 
 148. See, e.g., Former PTO Heads Cite Backlog as the Highest Priority, 
CONGRESSDAILY, Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.nationaljournal.com/ 
congressdaily/cda_20081212_2311.php; Posting of Patent Hawk to Patent 
Prospector, http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2008/12/backlog.html (Dec. 14, 
2008, 12:42 PM); cf. Dolak, supra note 58, at 12 (suggesting that reform would 
lead to an overall reduction in litigation). 
 149. See The Importance of Patent Reform on Small Business: Hearing Be-
fore the H. Comm. on Small Business, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Kevin 
Kirsch, Partner, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, LLP). 
 150. S. 3600 (allowing complaints to be brought if probable cause is shown 
and requiring the Director to decide within one year if misconduct occurred in 
§ 299(b)). 
 151. Id. (proposing § 299(c)). 
 152. Id. (proposing § 299(b)(3)(C)). Moreover, any parties held responsible 
for the misconduct are jointly and severally liable for any penalties assessed 
by the PTO. Id. § 299(b)(3)(D). 
 153. Noyes, supra note 132. 
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of the Federal Circuit noted that recent cases have solved some 
of the same issues to be addressed by the legislation.154 Addi-
tionally, Chief Judge Michel agreed that the PTO may have in-
adequate resources to handle inequitable-conduct claims155 as 
proposed by the Patent Reform Act of 2005,156 and now 2008.157  
Previously proposed amendments to the doctrine have 
failed and uncertainty continues to lurk. Elimination of the de-
fense’s draconian consequences will decrease the current incen-
tive for raising the defense in nearly every case. Furthermore, 
minimum guidelines will tailor the doctrine’s penalty to the 
misconduct. Part III recommends adopting minimum guide-
lines for inequitable conduct that will bring greater certainty to 
patent holders while still maintaining application process inte-
grity.  
III. MINIMUM GUIDELINES WITH INCREASED JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION BASED ON THE LEVEL OF MATERIALITY 
AND INTENT FOUND BY THE COURTS   
There appears to be an ideological impasse between mem-
bers of Congress and the patent community on whether the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct should be eliminated or stan-
dardized.158 This rift may be part of a larger policy disagree-
ment about whether patent rights are presently too strong or 
not strong enough, resulting in diverging opinions on whether 
the doctrine’s unenforceability provision is too strong or too 
weak.159 It may also be analogized to the debate over whether 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (noting Michel’s concern that “the agency may not have the capaci-
ty to conduct ‘mini-trials’ on inequitable conduct”). 
 156. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005) 
(providing that a court may determine that a patent is unenforceable). 
 157. See Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 11 (2008) (re-
quiring district courts to determine the nature of misconduct instead of the 
PTO). 
 158. This is indicated by the divergent legislative reform frameworks pre-
sented in recent years. The patent reform acts of 2005 and 2008 support a 
near elimination of the doctrine in the judicial context, unlike the 2006 and 
2007 proposals, which essentially codify current judicial precedent while 
choosing the objective but-for and reasonable-examiner materiality standards, 
respectively. See S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 11 (2008); Patent Reform Act of 2007, 
S. 1145 § 12 (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 
(2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005).  
 159. Generally speaking, parties dependent on one or two patents for their 
financial investments favor stronger patent rights whereas parties in indus-
tries with thousands of patents on single products believe patent rights are too 
strong and broad. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 110. 
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criminal punishments are too weak or too strong.160 In criminal 
law, adoption by most states and the federal government of 
sentencing guidelines is an attempt to provide uniform sentenc-
ing for criminal misconduct based on the act committed and the 
level of intent of the actor, among other factors.161 For example, 
the federal sentencing grid provides a range of sentences that a 
judge may impose based on the seriousness of the offense and 
the defendant’s criminal history.162 Similar to the sentencing 
practices in criminal law, the following proposed guidelines 
support combining the level of intent and materiality found by 
a court with judicial discretion to tailor the consequence to the 
misconduct. The proposed guidelines will increase certainty for 
patent holders by reducing the fear that patents will be ren-
dered entirely unenforceable, particularly when the misconduct 
is unrelated to patentability.  
A. ADOPTION OF CONSEQUENCE GUIDELINES 
Misconduct should be categorized and a tailored minimum 
consequence should be assigned to each category of conduct.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 160. See Punishment – Theories of Punishment, http://law.jrank.org/pages/ 
9576/Punishment-THEORIES-PUNISHMENT.html (last visited Apr. 27, 
2009) (describing utilitarian and retributivist theories of punishment, includ-
ing the basic rationales of each). 
 161. See Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Sentencing Guide-
lines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 299–
301 (1996). 
 162. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. 9 (2007).  
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Type of  
Misconduct 
Materiality 
Standard 
Intent 
Standard 
Proposed Minimum Guide-
line 
Related to  
patentability 
 
But it may 
have 
More than 
gross negli-
gence; 
requires  
evidence 
separate 
from mate-
riality of 
information 
Minimum guideline: claim af-
fected held unenforceable 
Judicial discretion: increase 
number of claims held unen-
forceable 
Unrelated to 
patentability 
i.e. incorrect 
filing status 
Reasonable 
examiner 
Same as 
above 
Minimum guideline: tempo-
rary, correctable unenforcea-
bility 
Judicial discretion: assess fees 
or sanctions 
Egregious  
intent to dece-
ive—
individual 
party  
consequences 
N/A Egregious 
intent to 
deceive 
Patent practitioner: order to 
PTO recommending investiga-
tion, sanctions, or disbarment 
from PTO 
Patent owner: financial penal-
ties tailored to deter future 
misconduct up to a maximum 
penalty of patent unenforcea-
bility 
Good-faith purchaser: judicial 
discretion to assess no penal-
ties for previous owners’ ac-
tions 
 
The adoption of the guidelines will reduce the windfall to 
an alleged infringer that occurs when courts hold the entire pa-
tent unenforceable. Additionally, the guidelines will continue to 
deter practitioners or applicants from engaging in dishonest 
behavior with the PTO. By organizing consequences based on 
the misconduct’s level of materiality and intent, uncertainty 
and apprehension will decrease. Further, the proposed mini-
mum guidelines are within the discretion of the district court 
judge, who is in the best position to determine the extent of the 
misconduct and the most equitable remedy. Only the but-it-
may-have and the reasonable-examiner materiality standards 
should be used to judge misconduct.  
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1. Misconduct Related to Patentability and Unenforceable 
Claims 
For misconduct related to patentability, the but-it-may-
have standard is still important for public policy reasons.163 
Public policy requires that only valid patents should be issued 
and enforced.164 The but-it-may-have standard encourages dis-
closure of information that may affect patentability, but might 
not cause the patent to be invalidated. This materiality stan-
dard does not remove the current incentive for practitioners to 
avoid researching prior art. However, it also does not increase 
uncertainty of patent applicants because they are already en-
couraged to submit information that may be considered border-
line to patentability.165 Once the court determines that the in-
formation may have affected patentability, the court should 
look to intent.  
The guideline for intent would be the same as articulated 
in Kingsdown, which required more than “gross negligence.”166 
Only intent that is supported by other evidence would allow a 
court to find inequitable conduct.167 Lack of any evidence to 
support a finding of intent to deceive by a clear and convincing 
standard would require the court to refrain from issuing a re-
medy, similar to a finding of no inequitable conduct.168  
The proposed guidelines would standardize the application 
of the materiality and intent standards. For conduct that may 
have affected the patent’s issuance, the significant difference 
between the current doctrine and the proposed minimum 
guideline is the doctrine’s penalty. Instead of requiring the 
judge to hold the entire patent unenforceable,169 the guidelines 
 
 163. For example, the but-it-may-have standard encourages policing of pa-
tents and is consistent with encouraging other such methods. See, e.g., John R. 
McNair, Note, If Hatch Wins, Make Waxman Pay: One-Way Fee Shifting as a 
Substitute Incentive to Resolve Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 2007 U. ILL. 
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 119, 141–42 (proposing attorney-fee shifting to encourage 
policing of patents). 
 164. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 819 (1945) (stating that there is a “public policy against the assertion and 
enforcement of patent claims infected with fraud and perjury”). 
 165. See, e.g., LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 958 F.2d 
1066, 1076 (Fed.Cir. 1992) (“Close cases should be resolved by disclosure, not 
unilaterally by the applicant.”). 
 166. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. at 872. 
 169. See id. at 874. 
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require that the judge hold only the claim affected by the mis-
conduct unenforceable. If necessary, a judge could use his or 
her discretion to increase the number of claims held unenforce-
able.  
The but-it-may-have standard should not encourage practi-
tioners to flood or mischaracterize information to the PTO be-
cause only information that may affect patentability will be 
considered. Patent practitioners would be more interested in 
submitting everything they believe could affect their patent’s 
issuance. By removing the requirement to hold the entire pa-
tent unenforceable, alleged infringers would no longer have an 
incentive to engage in costly and time consuming discovery un-
less the misconduct would likely result in one or more claims 
being invalidated. Alleged infringers already spend time and 
money to dig up material they believe will invalidate the claims 
of the patent, so this guideline will not create significant addi-
tional expense.  
2. Misconduct Unrelated to Patentability and Temporary 
Unenforceability 
The reasonable-examiner standard is important for ensur-
ing honest, good faith interactions between applicants and the 
PTO, but should not be a source of permanent unenforceability 
for patent holders. Under the proposed guidelines, misconduct 
that is important but unrelated to patentability, such as incor-
rect filing status, failure to pay maintenance fees, or relation-
ships with affiants, would not require the court to hold the en-
tire patent unenforceable.  
Misconduct unrelated to patentability would instead be 
weighed against independent evidence of intent to deceive the 
PTO, similar to the current application of the doctrine. Lack of 
clear and convincing evidence to support a finding of intent to 
deceive would require the court to issue no remedy for the de-
fendant, similar to the current finding of no inequitable con-
duct. The largest difference between this proposed minimum 
guideline and the current doctrine is seen when intent is in-
ferred from misconduct not related to patentability. Instead of 
holding the entire patent unenforceable, the district court 
would be required, at a minimum, to hold the claim or patent 
temporarily unenforceable until the conduct is corrected with 
judicial discretion to assess financial penalties or sanctions.170  
 
 170. For instance, applying the proposed guidelines to the facts in Ulead 
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By removing permanent unenforceability as a mandated 
consequence for misconduct unrelated to patentability, alleged 
infringers will no longer have an incentive to engage in costly 
and time consuming discovery unless the misconduct may have 
resulted in one or more claims being invalidated. This solution 
for material unrelated to patentability is likely to be the largest 
factor in decreasing the uncertainty and risk imposed by the 
current application of the doctrine. Moreover, knowing that un-
enforceability is temporary and correctable will reduce the de-
sirability of raising the defense in more frivolous situations.  
3. Egregious Intent to Deceive and Party-Specific 
Consequences 
Intent to deceive the PTO, which is found to be egregious 
by the court, but does not necessarily affect the patentability of 
the claims or patent, should have party-specific consequences. 
If the egregious behavior is committed by the patent practition-
er, the court should at least issue an order to the PTO recom-
mending investigation, sanctions, or disbarment from the PTO. 
These sanctions would provide an incentive for patent practi-
tioners to continue dealing fairly and honestly with the PTO.171 
In the event of egregious behavior by the patent owner or 
representative of the patent owner, the court should, at a min-
imum, issue an order for financial penalties equitably tailored 
to deter future misconduct with discretion to escalate the pe-
nalty and hold the entire patent unenforceable. The financial 
penalty needs to be adapted to the specific party because some 
parties will have no problem paying and will not be deterred by 
set fines. Knowing that the financial sanction will be custo-
mized incentivizes patent owners to deal fairly with the PTO. 
Additionally, by limiting the financial sanctions to egregious 
acts, the patentees also have some certainty that they will not 
be subject to penalties for good faith mistakes or minor acts of 
 
Systems, Inc. v. Lex Computer & Management Corp., the misconduct unrelated 
to patentability (improper maintenance fees) is material under the reasonable-
examiner standard and would result in temporary unenforceability until cor-
rected, with judicial discretion to increase the penalty assessed. 351 F.3d 1139, 
1146 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 171. The PTO already has disciplinary proceedings that it may use to pu-
nish, sanction, or disbar agents or attorneys that are guilty of gross miscon-
duct. See 35 U.S.C. § 32 (2000) (outlining consequences that may be imposed 
by the Director for any “person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or 
disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who does not comply the [PTO’s] 
regulations”). 
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misconduct. For a good-faith purchaser of a previously obtained 
patent where the previous patentee displayed egregious beha-
vior, the court may choose to not impose any financial sanc-
tions. Allowing court discretion for good-faith purchasers allows 
the district court to take account of the credibility of the cur-
rent patentee and make sure that patents are not sold or as-
signed to avoid financial sanctions. Congress or the Federal 
Circuit should adopt the above outlined guidelines for deter-
mining the doctrine’s consequences. 
B. FORA FOR CHANGE 
In the last four years, the Supreme Court solved several 
perceived problems associated with the patent system by re-
versing or vacating eight Federal Circuit decisions.172 Some be-
lieve this will, or already has, created motivation for the Feder-
al Circuit to address the remaining issues, such as the 
application of the doctrine of inequitable conduct.173 The Feder-
al Circuit sitting en banc could overrule its precedent permit-
ting only the consequence of complete patent unenforceabili-
ty.174 The Federal Circuit sitting en banc could also establish 
proper and consistent guidelines for selecting equitable reme-
dies for misconduct based on the level of materiality and intent 
found by clear and convincing evidence.175 Alternatively, reform 
could come through future legislation. This seems unlikely due 
to the failure of all recent patent reform legislation.176 
  CONCLUSION   
The Federal Circuit’s application of the doctrine of inequit-
able conduct, including the mandatory consequence of patent 
unenforceability, fosters uncertainty for patentees and practi-
tioners. Patentees feel less safe enforcing their patent rights 
 
 172. Dolak, supra note 58, at 2. 
 173. Id. at 2 n.5 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s sua sponte decision to 
hear In re Bilski, 264 F. App’x 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 174. See Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(“This court has adopted the rule that prior decisions of a panel of the court 
are binding precedent on subsequent panels unless and until overturned in 
banc.”). The court could overrule Kingsdown, which limited the doctrine’s con-
sequences to unenforceability of the entire patent. 863 F.2d at 877.  
 175. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2, 5–6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
11, 12, 15–16 (creating the Federal Circuit, in part to increase consistency and 
uniformity in patent cases). 
 176. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 110-259 (2008) (providing debate on the Patent 
Reform Act of 2007, which was never approved). 
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against alleged infringers for fear of having their entire patent 
held unenforceable. Alleged infringers have almost no incentive 
not to raise the defense. Patent practitioners are adopting prac-
tices that affect their dealings with patent examiners and are 
often blamed for hindering patent quality. Prior and current 
legislation has proposed many different solutions, none of 
which have been accepted, and all of which have faced deserved 
criticism. The adoption of category-specific minimum guidelines 
will reduce the current windfall incentive of defendants while 
maintaining the integrity of dealings with the PTO. The mini-
mum guidelines serve the interests of the public by preventing 
enforcement of invalid claims and the interests of patentees by 
not rendering patents unenforceable for simple acts of miscon-
duct or omission. Furthermore, by shifting responsibility to 
each party for their dealings with the PTO, the court can as-
sure that it is equitably applying the doctrine. The Federal Cir-
cuit must realize that mandatory death penalty sentences for 
patents are no longer appropriate for all inequitable-conduct 
findings. 
